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NO MORE WAITING FOR REVOLUTION: JAPAN
SHOULD TAKE POSITIVE ACTION TO IMPLEMENT THE
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS
OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN
M. Christina Luerat
Abstract: In 1985, Japan ratified the United Nations Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW"), which
requires the eradication of all legal, political, social and cultural structures that prevent
women from enjoying full equality with men. Under CEDAW, Japan is legally obligated
to strive for actual, not just formal, equality between men and women. CEDAW also
requires States Parties to take positive action to achieve gender equality.
Despite the Japanese government's apparent efforts to comply with CEDAW over
the last two decades, gender equality remains a distant reality. On July 8, 2003, the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women reviewed Japan's
compliance with CEDAW and concluded that gender equality is being achieved at a
glacial pace in Japanese society.
Japan's failure to achieve a gender equal society is largely the result of the Japanese
government's rule by consensus. Under this system, social beliefs and practices dictate
political action, and the government will not affirmatively act to change society in the
absence of a social or political consensus. Effectively, Japanese leaders wait for social
change to occur, and then adjust the law to conform to the new majority belief. Given
that CEDAW's vision of gender equality does not have widespread support among
Japanese, the government's approach to implementing CEDAW has been gradual,
compromising and incomplete. While Japan's efforts to comply with CEDAW have
nearly attained formal gender equality under the law, on a practical level, the status quo
has been almost entirely preserved. Rather than waiting for revolution, the government
should take affirmative measures to transform Japan into a gender equal society. To do
so while still maintaining its rule by consensus, the government needs to build a
consensus that will support gender equality in Japan.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In contemporary Japan, a woman's life is defined by her gender.
According to Japan's conservative majority,' the ideal Japanese woman
t The author would like to thank all those who have assisted in the process of writing this Comment,
including Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journaleditorial staff for their patience and insight, as well as the
University of Washington School of Law librarians for their knowledge and resourcefulness.
Conservatism in Japan is characterized by a deep commitment to tradition and the status quo. See
Paul Lansing & Tamra Domeyer, Japan's Attempt at Internationalizationand Its Lack of Sensitivity to
Minority Issues, 22 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 135, 140 (1991) (describing Japan's aversion to change). That the
conservatives are the majority is apparent from the "backlashes" to legislation and education campaigns
that support women's rights. See Japan NGO Network for CEDAW ("JNNC"), Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: The Summary Report of the NGOs in Japan
11 (July 16, 2003), http://www.jaiwr.org/jnnc/200307Oljnncsunumaryreport(en).pdf (last visited May 21,
2004) [hereinafter NGO Report].
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devotes herself exclusively to familial and domestic affairs, including caring
for children and elderly relatives. 2 Indeed, the feminine ideal of ryosai
kenbo, "good wife, wise mother," remains pervasive. 3 The structure of
Japanese society also continues to perpetuate traditional 4 gender roles,
limiting opportunities for women to be anything but caretakers. 5
Despite this social environment, recent generations of women are
postponing marriage and motherhood, indicating an unwillingness to be
defined by ryisai kenbo. 6 Growing numbers of young women prefer living
with their parents to marrying an incompatible mate. 7 They enjoy their
freedom by spending their salaries, earned from "pink-collar" jobs,8 on
leisure activities and luxury items. 9 Although these young women may not
be consciously working to change social practices,' 0 their behavior indicates
2

NANCY ROSENBERGER, GAMBLING WITH VIRTUE: JAPANESE WOMEN AND THE SEARCH FOR SELF

IN A CHANGING NATION 16 (2001).
3 See Kathleen S. Uno, The Death of "'Good Wife, Wise Mother"?, in DIMENSIONS OF
CONTEMPORARY JAPAN: WOMEN AND WOMEN'S ISSUES IN POST WORLD WAR II JAPAN 225 (Edward R.
Beauchamp ed., 1998). Developed by government officials in the late nineteenth century, the concept of
ryesai kenbo defined the ideal Japanese woman. Id. at 226. Even then, the official ideal did not reflect the
reality of working class Japanese women. Id.
Recognizing that tradition is a social construct, and not merely a historical fact, this Comment uses
the term "tradition" to describe social practices perceived as culturally-fixed by the conservative Japanese
majority-those who believe that gender roles are determined by custom and seek to uphold them.
Tradition is often used to legitimate social norms, justifying existing inequities. See Celestine I. Nyamu,
How Should Human Rights and Development Respond to Cultural Legitimization of Gender Hierarchy in
Developing Countries?,41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 381, 382 (2000). See infra Part IV.B for a discussion of how
tradition is manipulated to sustain gender inequality in Japanese society.
5 For instance, the public pension program continues to favor the stay-at-home wife, exempting the
spouse of a salary earner from paying premiums if she does not earn above a part-time wage. JNNC,
NGOs' Answers to the List of Issues and Questions for the Consideration of the Fourth and Fifth Periodic
Reports by Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women II (May 2003),
http://www.jaiwr.org/jnnc/japanngoanswersenglishfmal.pdf (last visited May 21, 2004) [hereinafter NGOs'
Answers]. Limited opportunities for permanent and fulltime employment also function to keep women at
home; women also continue to have difficulty obtaining non-secretarial employment with prospects for
advancement, despite a statute enacted for the purpose of ending discrimination against women in the
workplace. See infra Part III.A. See also Robbi Louise Miller, The Quiet Revolution: Japanese Women
Working around the Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 163, 191 (2003).
6 ROSENBERGER, supra note 2, at 132. In 2002, approximately half of Japanese women in their late'
twenties were unmarried, even though the traditional age of marriage for a woman was before twenty-five.
Fifth Periodic Report of Japan, CEDAW/C/JPN/5 10 (Sept. 13, 2002), available at http://ods-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NO2/600/19/IMG/N0260019.pdf (last visited May 21, 2002). Also, the
average number of children Japanese women will have over their lifetimes, or the total fertility rate, is 1.36,
indicating that the Japanese population, without immigration, will decline after 2006. Id.
7 ROSENBERGER, supra note 2, at 182-85.
8 The term "pink-collar" describes those forms of employment that have historically been
dominated by women, such as nursing, elementary school teaching, and secretarial work. Diane L. Bridge,
The Glass Ceiling and Sexual Stereotyping: Historicaland Legal Perspective of Women in the Workplace,
4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 581, 597 (1997).
9 ROSENBERGER, supra note 2, at 182-85.
'o See Miller, supra note 5, at 184 (interviewee stating: "I suppose if this were America, women in
that position [of not being hired in jobs for which they are qualified] would feel discriminated against, and
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that conservative ideals concerning gender are losing their hold on Japan.
Indeed, many scholars have concluded that young women's choice to resist
traditional roles foreshadows a significant change in gender relations in
Japan. 1'

The United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW") seeks to facilitate this change
to a gender equal society.' 1 In 1985, Japan ratified CEDAW without
reservations, pledging itself to establish gender equality throughout Japanese
society. 13 As a state party to CEDAW, Japan is legally obligated 14 to pursue
"all appropriate measures ... to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations,
customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women."15 As
part of its obligation, Japan must also submit periodic reports to the
Committee on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women ("the
Committee") 16 every four years.
On July 8, 2003, the Committee reviewed Japan's fourth and fifth
periodic reports, 17 noting that the pace of social change with respect to

gender equality has been "frustratingly slow" in Japan.' 8 Its pronouncement
echoed the dissatisfaction expressed by Japanese nongovernmental
organizations ("NGOs") during the Committee's review.' 9 The Committee
also advised Japan to take more proactive measures to achieve greater

they'd try to do something about it. We [Japanese women] just react by going out and having fun, by not
being a part of it [the corporate world].").
1 As evidenced by the titles of the following books, many scholars have great hope that the social
position of women in Japan will be improved soon: PATRICIA MORLEY, THE MOUNTAIN IS MOVING:
JAPANESE WOMEN'S LIVES (1999); KAREN KELSKY, WOMEN ON THE VERGE: JAPANESE WOMEN, WESTERN
DREAMS (2001); NANCY ROSENBERGER, GAMBLING WITH VIRTUE: JAPANESE WOMEN AND THE SEARCH
FOR SELF IN ACHANGING NATION (2001).
12 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979,
1249 U.N.T.S 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
13 Miller, supra note 5, at 194.
14
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 26, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 339 ("Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them
in good faith.").
15 CEDAW, supra note 12, art. 2(0.
16 The Committee is composed of twenty-three experts on women's rights. Id. art. 17.
17 Fourth Periodic Report of Japan, CEDAW/C/JPN/4 (Aug. 28, 1998), available at http://ods-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/355/16/IMG/N9835516.pdf (last visited May 21, 2004), and Fifth
Periodic Report of Japan, supra note 6.
18 See Press Release, Committee on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Committee
Experts Noting Important Progress in Japan's Legal Framework, Welcome New Legislation to Foster
at
available
7,
2003),
(Sept.
Equality,
Gender
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/woml408revl.doc.htm (last visited May 21, 2004) [hereinafter
Committee Press Release].
19 See Yumi Wijers-Hasegawa, Group to Push for Greater Gender Equality in Japan, JAPAN TIMES,
July 1, 2003. See also Government Faces Grilling on Women's Rights, NIKKEI WEEKLY, May 12, 2003.
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Amid this domestic and international pressure, Japan

should reevaluate its efforts to achieve gender equality.
Although Japan has already substantially complied with CEDAW by
taking legal and 2political action,21 its efforts have not translated into actual
This Comment argues that Japan's efforts to legislate
gender equality.
gender equality have failed because of the government's method of rule by
consensus, under which law and politics must reflect social consensus in
order to preserve social harmony. 2 In the absence of social consensus, the
Japanese government's political actions are tentative at best. 24 As long as
Japan's conservative social majority continues to embrace the ideal of ryo-sai
kenbo,2 5 the government will weakly enforce legislation and policies that are
contrary to this ideal.26 Thus, Japan adopts gender equality legislation
20 Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 29th Sess., Supp.
No. 38, at 130-38, U.N. Doc. A/58/38 (2003) [hereinafter Report].
21 See infra Part III for a discussion of the efficacy of this government action. For the government's

presentation of its efforts to comply with CEDAW, see Fifth Periodic Report of Japan, supra note 6. For
the perspective of non-governmental organizations ("NGOs"), see NGO Report, supra note 1. See also
Japan NGO Network for CEDAW, Statement at the CEDA W Pre-Session Working Group (Feb. 3, 2003),
available at http://www.jaiwr.org/jnnc/030203presen.html (last visited May 7, 2004) [hereinafter NGO
Statement].
22 This Comment uses the term "actual gender equality" to describe equality that is a social reality,
which is actually experienced by women in their daily lives. Often called de facto equality, this form of
egalitarianism is distinguished from de jure or formal equality that provides for equality in the law. For an
explanation of the difference between de jure and de facto equality, see Masako Kamiya, Women in Japan,
20 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REv. 447 (1986) (explaining that de jure equality can preserve the status quo, which
includes discrimination against women).
23 See FRANK UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN 1-2 (1987). The values of
harmony and consensus are derived from Confucianism. Id. at 1. See also Kiyoko Kamio Knapp, Don't
Awaken The Sleeping Child. Japan's Gender Equality Law and the Rhetoric Of Gradualism, 8 COLUM. J.
GENDER&L. 143, 145-46(1999).
24 See, e.g., Committee Press Release, supra note 18 (Japanese delegate, Mariko Bando,
DirectorGeneral of the Gender Equality Bureau, explaining that a Panel on Equal Employment Opportunity Policies
had not yet developed a policy concerning "indirect discrimination" against women, because it was still
"build[ing] consensus" on the definition of indirect discrimination). In response to comments from the
Committee criticizing the slow pace of social change in Japan, Ms. Bando admitted that in Japanese society
there is "perhaps an excessive emphasis on consensus." Id.
25 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. See also Knapp, supra note 23, at 160.
26 The system of rule by consensus severely undermines the government's power to effect social
change.
Governments can successfully use law to remedy social injustices, regardless of popular
dissention. For instance, in the United States, Congress enacted legislation to protect African-Americans'
civil rights, even though significant portions of the country opposed the legislation. Civil Rights Act of
1866, Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2004)); Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2004). For information on difficulties in implementing this legislation, see
generallyJack M. Beerman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, Fifty Years Later, 34 CONN.
L. REv. 981 (2002). Encapsulating the American approach to using law to achieve social justice, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts maintained that "an unconstitutional situation [cannot be
allowed] to fester because the remedy might not reflect a broad social consensus" in Goodridge v. Dept of
Public Health, 328, 798 N.E.2d 941, 958 (Mass. 2003) (holding that the denial of marriage licenses to
same-sex couples was a violation of the state's constitutional guarantee of equal protection). Conversely,
the Japanese approach does not remedy social injustices until a social consensus supports those remedies.
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without sanctions,27 relying on individuals' voluntary compliance to change
society. This tactic is contrary to CEDAW, which requires States Parties 28 to
actively work for gender equality.29 In order to faithfully comply with
CEDAW while preserving its rule by consensus, the Japanese government
must take affirmative measures to build a consensus that will support gender
equality in Japan.
In exploring how the Japanese government may more effectively
promote the creation of a gender equal society, this Comment examines the
affirmative measures Japan should adopt to adequately implement
CEDAW. 3 ° Part II of this Comment describes the Japanese government's
obligations under CEDAW, as well as the legal, political, cultural, and social
changes that gender equality requires. Part III evaluates the actions the
Japanese government has already taken to achieve CEDAW's vision of
gender equality and Part IV describes the limited social change that has
resulted from these efforts. Finally, Part V discusses the cultural reasons for
the slow progress of gender equality in Japan and recommends specific legal
and political measures the Japanese government can use to initiate actual
gender equality.
II.

JAPAN'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER

CEDAW

CEDAW is an ambitious international instrument that obligates all
States Parties to strive for the ideal of gender equality. CEDAW has two
distinct functions. First, it defines gender equality, providing an ideological
framework that gives States Parties a substantive vision of the gender
equality towards which they must strive. 31 Second, CEDAW establishes a
legal framework upon which gender equality may be initiated.32

27 For an explanation of Japan's use of law without sanctions, see John

0.

Haley, Sheathing the

Sword ofJustice in Japan:An Essay on Law without Sanctions, 8 J. JAPANESE STUD. 265 (1982).
28 CEDAW uses the term "States Parties" to identify all the nation-states that have ratified the treaty.
CEDAW, supra note 12, art. 2.
29 CEDAW, supra note 12, art. 2 (stating "States Parties ... agree to pursue by all appropriate
means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women").
30 Although rule by consensus severely limits the legal and political measures Japan may take to
achieve gender equality, the author does not suggest that Japan alter its approach to government; that
hegemonic suggestion does not adequately respect Japan's sovereignty or its Confucian values.
31 CEDAW, supra note 12, art. 1.
32 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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The Social Change Mandated by CEDA W Sets an Ambitious Goalfor
Japan

Under CEDAW, Japan must rigorously pursue universal gender
equality. First, CEDAW obligates Japan to provide gender equality in all
aspects of life-political, economic, legal, domestic, educational, and most
ambitiously, cultural.33 Described as the "international bill of rights for
women," 34 CEDAW does not tolerate any cultural impediments to women's
exercise of essential rights and freedoms. 35 Thus, Japan must strive to

eradicate all patriarchal 36 and androcentric 37 paradigms that structure
Japanese culture,38 regardless of whether they are state-sponsored.39
33 Article 1 establishes the scope of CEDAW's application as "the political, economic, social,
cultural, civil or any other field." CEDAW, supra note 12, art. 1. In specifying that CEDAW seeks to
secure women's rights in "any other field," Article 1 establishes CEDAW as utterly comprehensive,
allowing no realm of human experience to become a sacred enclave for discrimination against women. See
Brad R. Roth, The CEDAW as a Collective Approach to Women's Rights, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 187, 189
(2002) (explaining that CEDAW extends to private as well as state discrimination and to intentional as well
as de facto discrimination).
14 Division for the Advancement of Women, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discriminationagainst Women, at http://www.un.org.womenwatch/daw/cedaw (last visited May 7, 2004).
35 CEDAW, supra note 12, arts. 1, 5. States Parties must "guarantee [women] the exercise and
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men." Id. art. 3.
36 Patriarchy, or "power of the fathers," is the system that places men in positions of power over
women in the family and in society. See WOMEN: IMAGES AND REALITY 9 (Amy Kesselman et al. eds., 2d
ed. 1999). Through patriarchy women are disenfranchised from socioeconomic and political institutions,
and the law is often the means of disinheriting women. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 2
(2001). For instance, during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Western societies, women were
denied the right to vote, own property, initiate lawsuits, and be employed and maintain one's own earnings
without spousal consent. Kristian Miccio, Women and the Law, in WOMEN: IMAGES AND REALITY 167-68,
supra.
37 An ideological framework that sustains patriarchy, androcentricism is the valuing of the male to
the subordination of the female. Androcentricism posits male experience as the norm and the standard of
humanity, while female experience is a deviation from that allegedly neutral and universal standard. See
SANDRA L. BEM, LENSES OF GENDER: TRANSFORMING THE DEBATE ON SEXUAL INEQUALITY 40-42 (1993).

38 CEDAW requires States Parties to eliminate "social and cultural patterns of conduct... which are
based on the idea of the inferiority or superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and
women." CEDAW, supra note 12, art. 5. CEDAW may be interpreted as advocating the destruction of
culture, contravening the principles of multiculturalism. Much has been written about the fundamental
conflict between multiculturalism and feminism. See, e.g., Gila Stopler, Countenancingthe Oppression of
Women: How Liberals Tolerate Religious and Cultural Practices that Discriminate Against Women, 12
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 154 (2003). Yet, it is not a zero-sum conflict. Some scholars consider the
"cultural legitimization of gender hierarchy" rather than cultural practices to be antithetical to the quest for
gender equality. Nyamu, supra note 4, at 382-83. Because culture is multifaceted, those in power can
appropriate cultural practices that support existing gender inequalities. Id. Thus, it is this use of culture to
justify the status quo that is detrimental to gender equality. In addition, multiculturalism is not equivalent
to cultural relativism, which refrains from passing value judgments on any cultural practice. Leti Volpp,
Blaming Culture for Bad Behavior, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: AN ANTI-ESSENTIALIST READER 282

(Nancy E. Dowd & Michelle S. Jacobs eds., 2003). Volpp asserts that "valuing difference does not destroy
our ability to judge among differences," concluding that feminism is not therefore incompatible with
multiculturalism. Id. See also Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1181
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Second, CEDAW requires States Parties to pursue gender equality "by
all appropriate means and without delay.",40 Accordingly, Japan should not
rely exclusively on legislation to achieve a gender equal society.
Recognizing that legal equality does not necessarily result in actual equality,
the Committee recommends that States Parties take "positive action" in
order to fully implement CEDAW.4' Specifically, CEDAW encourages
States Parties to use temporary special measures, such as preferential42
treatment or quota systems, to advance the social position of women.
Thus, under CEDAW, Japan is obligated to adopt affirmative measures to
establish gender equality in all aspects of its society. As an international
treaty, CEDAW has legal force in Japan, establishing methods of enforcing
the government's obligations.
B.

JudicialInterpretation Undermines CEDAW's Force in Japan ' Legal
Framework

Despite Japan's favorable incorporation of international law in its
legal framework, the judiciary, as well as other government officials,
customarily undermine CEDAW's legal force. In this framework, CEDAW
has the same legal force as domestic Japanese law. 43 After the Diet" ratifies
(2001). In light of these distinctions, Article 5 of CEDAW can be interpreted as refusing to recognize a
cultural defense that legitimates patriarchy and androcentrism.
39 CEDAW, supra note 12, art. 2(e) (obligating States Parties to "eliminate discrimination against
women by any person, organization or enterprise").
40 CEDAW, supra note 12, art. 2. The question of whether CEDAW, as a legal instrument, has the
power to achieve the social change necessary for gender equality will not be fully explored in this
Comment. See infra Part V.B for a brief discussion of the efficacy of law in achieving social change.
Regardless of the answer to this question, the comprehensive equality required by CEDAW serves as an
ideal by which progress can be measured. States Parties, including Japan, are legally obligated to achieve
the closest approximation of universal gender equality within their societies.
4, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation
5 on
Temporary Special Measures, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
th
Women,
7
Sess.,
U.N.
Doc.
A/43/38
(1988),
available
at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recomm.htm
(last visited May 21, 2004) [hereinafter
Recommendation 5].
42 CEDAW, supra note 12, art. 4. See also Recommendation 5, supra note 41. In
its recent review,
the Committee advised Japan to develop special temporary measures to increase employment opportunities
for women and the number of women in political office. Report, supra note 20, at 136.
43 NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [Constitution] art. 98, para. 2 (1946). English translation available
at http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/Japan/English/english-Constitution.html (last visited May 21, 2004).
This article states: "The treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations shall be faithfully
observed." Id. The Japanese government interprets Article 98(2) to give international law the force of law
within Japan. YuJI IWASAWA, INTERNATIONAL LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND JAPANESE LAW: THE IMPACT

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON JAPANESE LAW 29 (1998). The precedence given to international law
distinguishes Japan from other nation states. For example, the United States adopts a less deferential
approach to international law. See infra note 45.
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an international treaty, the instrument is presumed to be self-executing. In
addition, under the Japanese Constitution, a ratified international treaty
supersedes domestic statutes.46 While it is unclear whether a trea7, can
prevail over a conflicting provision of the Japanese Constitution, 7 the
Japanese Constitution does not bar human rights conventions from providing
citizens greater protection than domestic law. 48 Insofar as Japan ratified
CEDAW without reservations, all of its provisions have the force of law in
Japan and supersede domestic legislation.
Although Japanese citizens can bring suit in Japanese courts under
CEDAW when particular provisions have been violated, these claims are
Most Japanese courts assume that ratified
generally unsuccessful.4 9
50
international instruments, such as CEDAW, are directly applicable law and

do not examine the issue.5' While Japanese courts have generally rejected
claims based on alleged CEDAW violations 52 they have not done so based
on the fact that CEDAW is inapplicable. 53 Thus, the presumption that
CEDAW is directly applicable stands. Consequently, CEDAW theoretically
" The Diet is the main legislative body in Japan. See IWASAWA, supra note 43, at 2.
45 A self-executing treaty is one that immediately has domestic legal effect without further

government action beyond the act of ratification. KENNETH L. PORT & GERALD PAUL MCALINN,
COMPARATIVE LAW: LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN 839 (2d ed. 2003). In contrast, the United
States presumes the exact opposite; without express language in the treaty declaring that it is selfexecuting, the United States will not grant it the force of law. Id.
46 IWASAWA, supra note 43, at 95.
47 PORT, supra note 45, at 842.
4s See infra Part III.A.
49 IWASAWA, supra note 43, at 63. PORT, supra note 45, at 842 (stating that human rights
conventions "create standing for individual human rights plaintiffs"). A treaty with the force of law can be
distinguished from one that is directly applicable. See IWASAWA, supra note 43, at 44-46. Whereas parties
can request Japanese courts to interpret a treaty with the force of law, litigants can bring claims under a
directly applicable treaty. Id. at 44-45. In Japan, a treaty that has domestic force of law is presumed to be
directly applicable. Id.
5 As the term implies, "directly applicable" treaties may be directly applied in domestic law,
allowing citizens to bring suit under its provisions. IWASAWA, supra note 43, at 44.
51 PORT, supra note 45, at 842. Some courts have determined the question of direct applicability by
looking to the intent of the parties as well as to the precision of the treaty's articles. IWASAWA, supra note
43, at 46-48. First, the presumption in favor of direct applicability will be nullified if the signatories have
expressly provided that the treaty is not directly applicable. Id. at 47. Second, if the provisions do not
require a particular course of action by one of the parties, the treaty cannot be directly applicable. Id. at 4748.
52 For instance, in a challenge to Article 733 of the Civil Code which requires divorced women (but
not men) to wait six months before remarrying, the plaintiff invoked inter alia Articles 2, 15, and 16 of
CEDAW. 1375 HANREI JIHO 30 (Hiroshima District Court 1991). The court upheld the waiting period,
since it ensured the certainty of a child's paternity and was therefore reasonable. See also Junko Torii,
International Human Rights Law and the Japanese Law Concerning Family Relations, in JAPAN AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 265 (Nisuke Ando ed., 1999).
53 IWASAWA, supra note 43, at 63. See supra note 52 for an example of the rationale given by
Japanese courts for rejecting claims under CEDAW.
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provides Japanese citizens with enforceable rights in Japan's legal system.
Yet, in practice, the judiciary appears reluctant to enforce these rights.
Although many scholars assume that human rights treaties, such as
CEDAW, can be used to compel social change in Japan,5 5 the force of these
instruments is customarily undermined through judicial interpretation.
Although trained to maintain judicial restraint, Japanese judges nevertheless
act to preserve the social status quo by refusing to recognize legislation or
governmental policies as violations of CEDAW. 56 For example, the
Hiroshima High Court upheld the waiting period that prevents widows from
marrying for six months after the death of a spouse as a reasonable measure

to ensure accuracy in determining the paternity of children. 7 By
interpreting CEDAW to prohibit only "unreasonable discrimination," the
court ignored CEDAW's clear language, requiting States Parties to
"condemn discrimination against women in all its forms. 58 Accordingly all
gender discrimination, whether "reasonable," culturally-justified, or
convenient, violates CEDAW. 59 As this example illustrates, Japanese courts
can undermine CEDAW through judicial interpretation.
In addition, the legal force of CEDAW in Japan is compromised by
the government's characterization of it as a "progressive" treaty. Progressive
54 PORT, supra note 45, at 842. However, not all CEDAW
provisions may be directly applicable;
provisions that require a general policy or program rather than prohibit particular actions are not. The issue
is similar to the U.S. constitutional doctrine of vagueness, which requires laws to provide an ascertainable
standard of conduct so that those who are bound by the law have fair notice of the proscribed action.
Japanese courts must have a clear standard by which to evaluate whether the government has violated
CEDAW's provisions. Thus, Article 5, which requires States Parties to alter discriminatory customs,
would not be directly applicable, because it would be difficult to prove that the government violated that
provision. For instance, did the government violate the provision by not making those customs illegal? Or
by not instituting a media campaign to change the stereotypes upon which those customs rely? Because
there are numerous methods by which Article 5 can be implemented, Japanese courts will not recognize
that it is directly applicable. Consequently, Article 5 and similar CEDAW provisions cannot be invoked by
Japanese litigants.
55 Keneth L. Port argues that "the Japanese are actively utilizing international
legal norms as
transformative tools of social change." PORT, supra note 45, at 849. Port's optimism must be tempered by
the reality that such transformation has been slow, at least as it pertains to women's rights. In more
subdued tones, Junko Torii asserts that "Many Japanese are now aware that by utilizing human rights
conventions they could transform their society." Junko, supra note 52, at 269.
56 See Junko, supra note 52, at 268 (describing "the negative attitude of... Japanese court[s] toward
the application of human rights conventions"). See also David T. Johnson, American Law in Japanese
Perspective, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 771, 780-81 (2003) (explaining that the bureaucratically organized
Japanese judiciary is predictably conservative, aligning themselves with the Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) "because Japanese judges who defer to LDP politicians on sensitive questions consistently do better
in their careers than judges who do not").
57 1406 HANREI JIHO 3 (Hiroshima High Ct., Nov. 28, 1991). See also IWASAWA, supra note 43,
at
241.
51 CEDAW, supra note 12, art. 2.
51 See supra Part II.A.
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treaties identify specific goals that should be immediately realized.6 °
Consequently, if the goal is not achieved at the time of signing, the treaty
will not be considered breached.6' Japan views CEDAW as progressive in
63
nature, 62 although some scholars do not agree with this characterization.
By characterizing CEDAW as a progressive treaty, the government can
the gradual
escape the obligation to fully implement its provisions,
64 justifying
equality.
gender
achieve
to
instituted
has
it
measures
III.

CEDAW COMPELS

JAPAN TO

TAKE

LEGAL AND POLITICAL ACTION BUT

THESE EFFORTS FAIL TO ACHIEVE GENDER EQUALITY

In attempting to comply with CEDAW, the Japanese government has
taken action apparently designed to achieve the treaty's objectives. CEDAW
has prompted new legislation, such as the Equal Employment Opportunity
Law and the Basic Law for a Gender-Equal Society.65 In addition, the
government also created administrative agencies designed to study the issue
of achieving gender equality in Japan, monitor the progress toward this goal,
and recommend policies the government can pursue.66 These measures have
substantially established formal gender equality under the law, 6 7 which is a
prerequisite for actual equality. 68 Yet, even though the government has
performed important work, CEDAW requires additional action.

60 IWASAWA, supra note 43, at 40-41.
61 id.
62 See id. at 43.
63 Id. at 4344.
Id. at 209. See also NGO Statement, supra note 21 (stating that the government invoked the fact
that CEDAW does not require immediate eradication of all discrimination against women to support the
dismissal of a case to challenge the wage gap between men and women at a private company).
Part III.A-B.
65 See infra
'6 See infra Part III.C.
67 IWASAWA, supra note 43, at 246-47. The Japanese government asserts that the Civil Code
provides equal rights to men and women. See Hayashi Yoko, Policies of the JapaneseGovernment Toward
Women, in VOICES FROM THE JAPANESE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 84 (AMPO ed. 1996). For a discussion of
the parts of Japanese law that remain discriminatory toward women, see id. at 82-89.
68 Formal equality is a necessary but not sufficient condition for actual gender equality. In order to
move beyond this preliminary state of equality to a point of equilibrium in gender relations-which is
actual equality-male privilege must be countered in society. CEDAW recommends that States Parties
adopt temporary special measures which are more favorable to women in order to "accelerat[e] de facto
equality between men and women," expressly stating that such measures are not discriminatory. CEDAW,
supranote 12, art. 4.
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Transcending Constitutional Limitations: CEDAW Provides for
GreaterGender Equality Than the JapaneseConstitution

By prohibiting all discrimination, whether "reasonable" or employed
by private actors, CEDAW affords greater protection for Japanese women's
rights than the Japanese Constitution. Before Japan ratified CEDAW, the
Japanese Constitution was the primary instrument to guarantee gender
equality.69 Article 14 of the Constitution provides: "All of the people are
equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political,
economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or
family origin., 70 This guarantee is only enforceable against the government,
and accordingly does not bar gender-based discrimination in the private
sector.7 1 Article 14 has been further limited by Japanese courts, which have
interpreted the provision to only prohibit state action that unreasonably
discriminates against women.72 Prompting Japan to transcend the limits of
its Constitution, CEDAW compelled the enactment of the Equal
Employment
Opportunity Law73 and the amendment of the Nationality Law
74
1950.
of
1.

Equal Employment OpportunityLaw Prohibits PrivateDiscrimination

CEDAW prompted Japan to enact the Equal Employment Opportunity
Law ("1985 EEOL") to remedy the discrimination women faced in private
employment.75 Before CEDAW was ratified, most Japanese employers
69

See Yuji Iwasawa, The Impact of International Human Rights Law on Japanese Law: The Third

Reformation for Japanese Women, 34 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L L. 21, 21-22 (1991) [hereinafter Third
Reformation]. Following World War II, the Japanese Constitution was amended to provide women basic
civil rights. Id. In addition to Article 14's general guarantee of equality, Article 24 provides for equality in
family life and Article 44 prohibits sexual discrimination in the right to vote and be elected to public office.
KENPO, arts. 14, 24, 44 (1946). See also Third Reformation, supra, at 22.
70 KENPO, art. 14, para. 1 (1946).
71 Miller, supra note 5, at 190. See also Kamiya, supra note 22, at 453.
72 Kamiya, supra note 22, at 454 (observing that judges use traditional gender
roles to defend
discrimination challenged under Article 14, and the challenged practice is then considered "reasonable and
justifiable").
73 Equal Employment Opportunity Law, Law No. 113 of 1972, as amended by Law No. 45 of 1985
(partially reprinted in Nakano Mami, Ten Years Under the Equal Employment Opportunity Law, in VOICES
FROM THE JAPANESE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT, supra note 67, at 79-81). The EEOL was later amended in
1997, see infra note 100. See also IWASAWA, supra note 43, at 215; Miller, supra note 5, at 193-94.
74 Nationality Law, Law No. 147 of 1950, as amended by Law No. 45 of 1984. English translation
available at http:// www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/CIAB/law0l.html (last visited May 21, 2004).
75 Before the 1985 EEOL, the Labor Standards Law ("LSL") provided the only legal protection
specifically afforded to women employees in the private sector. See Labor Standards Law, Law No. 49 of
1947. English translation available at http://www.campus.ne.jp/-labor/rootseiri/roukihou.htm (last visited
May 7, 2004). See also Miller, supra note 5, at 191; Catherine W. Brown, JapaneseApproaches to Equal
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assumed that women would only be employed until familial caretaking
responsibilities became paramount in their lives, either upon marriage or the
76
birth of children. Many employers therefore structured work opportunities
for women to reflect the belief that work should be of secondary importance
in their lives, forcing them into part-time positions.77 Also, women were
hired almost exclusively into secretarial and other non-managerial positions,
where they assisted their male co-workers and served tea.78 As "office
flowers," female office workers had the additional duty of bringing beauty
and grace to the workplace. 79 Many women were therefore forced to retire
upon marriage, pregnancy or at the age of thirty.80 Female employees also
had little or no opportunity for promotion,81 and employers would
purposefully hire women who had completed high school or junior college,
but not university graduates.8 2 The segregation of men and women in the
work force was reflected in the employment section of newspapers, which
had separate categories for women and men.8 3 All of these practices conflict
with CEDAW, which expressly requires the elimination of employment
discrimination.
Realizing that legal reform was necessary before CEDAW could be
ratified, the Japanese government enacted the 1985 EEOL, the first Japanese
law to prohibit sexual discrimination and secure gender equality in private
employment.85 Under the 1985 EEOL, women did see some improvements
Rights for Women: The Legal Framework, 12 L. IN JAPAN 29, 30 (1979). Although the LSL prohibits
"discriminatory treatment with respect to wages, working hours or other working conditions by reason of
the nationality, creed, or social status of any worker," gender is not a protected category. Labor Standards
Law, supra, art. 3. Most LSL provisions provide special protections for women, such as maternity leave.
Id. art. 64-2 (Working Hours and Rest Days), art. 64-3 (Night Work), art. 64-4 (Ban on Underground
Labor), art. 64-5 (Limitations on Dangerous and Injurious Work for Expectant and Nursing Mothers), art.
65 (Before and After Childbirth), art. 67 (Time for Childcare), art. 68 (Measures for Women for Whom
Work During Menstrual Period Would be Especially Difficult). See also IWASAWA, supra note 43, at 213.
Because these special protections authorized employers to treat women differently from men, the drafters
of the LSL reasoned that LSL's protections for women would violate a guarantee of equality with men. Id.
Unable to distinguish between discriminatory and disparate treatment, the drafters concluded that they
could not extend Article 3's prohibition against discrimination to women. Id.
76 See Mami, supra note 73, at 66.
77 See id.
78 IWASAWA, supranote 43, at 213. See also Brown, supra note 75, at 29.
71 See Kiyoko Kamio Knapp, Note, Still Office Flowers: Japanese Women Betrayed by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Law, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 83 (1995) (describing women's role in the
workplace as "ornamental"). See also IWASAWA, supra note 43, at 213 (stating that office flowers "needed
to be replaced from time to time," alluding to the fact that their beauty fades).
80 IWASAWA, supranote 43, at 213. See also Brown, supra note 75, at 34-40.
81 IWASAWA, supranote 43, at 213.
82 Id. For an explanation of this discrimination against women college graduates, see infra note 173.
83 Miller, supra note 5, at 197.
84 CEDAW, supra note 12, at art. 11.
85 IWASAWA, supranote 43, at 213.
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in their opportunities for employment.86 For the first time, they could
compete for career track positions with opportunities for advancement.87 In
addition, help wanted ads in newspapers were no longer segregated into
male and female categories.88
Despite the advances instituted by the 1985 EEOL,89 the legislation
was notoriously weak. 90 Most notably, compliance with the prohibitions of
the 1985 EEOL was largely voluntary: the statute merely counseled
employers to "endeavor" to provide equality in the areas of recruitment,
hiring, assignment, and promotion. 9 1 Only severe discrimination, such as
mandatory retirement policies and the provision of different job training and
fringe benefits to men and women, were categorically prohibited. 92 Even if
employers violated these specific prohibitions, however, the 1985 EEOL
offered no formal legal consequences.93 Rather than instituting fines or
providing a cause of action, 94 the 1985 EEOL established a system of
voluntary mediation that required the mutual consent of all parties. 95 Not
only could an employer avoid mediation by withholding consent, but the

86 Miller, supra note 5, at 197.
87 id.

88 Id.
'9 But see Miller, supra note 5, at 199, arguing that the 1985 EEOL merely codified the progress
litigants had acquired in the landmark case of Sumitomo Cement v. Suzuki, 18 RO-DO-KANKEI MINJI
SAIBAN REISHO 1407 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Dec. 20, 1966), and its progeny. Sumitomo Cement held that forced
retirement upon marriage violated the public policy articulated in Article 90 of the Civil Code. Miller's
argument, however, appears flawed because case law has no precedential value in a civil law state, such as
Japan, where judicial decisions only provide remedies for the individual litigants. See IWASAWA, supra
note 43, at 214-15.
90 For criticism of the 1985 EEOL, see Knapp, supra note 23, at 154-73; Jan M. Bergeson & Kaoru
Yamamoto Oba, Japan's New Equal Employment Opportunity Law: Weapon or Heirloom Sword?, 1986
B.Y.U. L.REV. 865 (1986); M. Diana Helweg, Note, Japan'sEqualEmployment Opportunity Act: A FiveYear Look at Its Effectiveness, 9 B.U. INT'L L.J. 293 (1991); Helen A. Goff, Glass Ceilings in the Land of
the Rising Sons: The Failureof the Workplace Gender DiscriminationLaw and Policy in Japan, 26 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1147 (1995); Robbi Louise Miller, Note, Women's Job Hunting in the "IceAge": Frozen
Opportunities in Japan, 13 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 223 (1998). But cf Loraine Parkinson, Japan's Equal
Employment Opportunity Law: An Alternative Approach to Social Change, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 604 (1989)
(arguing that the 1985 EEOL's non-coercive approach could be effective); Barbara Molony, Japan's 1986
Equal Employment Opportunity Law and the Changing Discourse on Gender, 20 SIGNS 268, 272 (1995)
(concluding that, despite the EEOL's inadequacies, it provided the perception that women could aspire to
professional employment).
91 Equal Employment Opportunity Law, supra note 73, arts. 6-7. See Miller, supra note 5, at 196.
92 Equal Employment Opportunity Law, supra note 73, arts. 8-10. See IWASAWA, supra note 43, at
216.
93 See generally Equal Employment Opportunity Law, supra note 73. See also Miller, supra note 5,
at 196.
94 Miller, supra note 5, at 196.
95 Equal Employment Opportunity Law, supra note 73, arts. 13-21. See also Miller, supra note 5, at
196, 202.
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employer could also disregard the mediator's proposed settlement, for it was

not legally binding upon the parties.96

Because the 1985 EEOL was largely voluntary, it failed to attain
actual gender equality. In the early 1990s, only 3.7% of women were
employed in jobs on the career track, whereas virtually all men (99%) were
accepted into positions on that track. 97 These statistics suggest that
discrimination against women in the workplace persisted, but in more
indirect forms. Although employers could no longer prohibit women from
applying for jobs on the professional track, they simply did not hire them
when they did.98 In fact, many employers 99still strenuously encouraged
women to apply for traditionally "female" jobs.
Widespread criticism of the 1985 EEOL prompted the government to
amend the statute in 1997 ("1997 EEOL").100 The 1997 EEOL expressly
prohibits all discriminatory practices and requires employers to provide
equality in recruitment, hiring, assignment, and promotion.1° Yet, it too
fails to provide strong enforcement mechanisms. The 1997 EEOL merely
eliminates the mutual consent requirement for mediation and provides for
publication of the names of companies who violate its provisions. 102 The
extent of the social change
produced by these amendments, if any, has not
03
yet been determined. 1
2.

1985 Amendment to the Nationality Act
"Reasonable" Discrimination

of 1950 Prohibits

CEDAW also expanded the protections of Article 14 of the Japanese
Constitution by providing for greater gender equality in Japanese nationality
laws. Under the Nationality Law of 1950, the citizenship of a child was
determined solely through paternity-such that a child bom to a Japanese
mother and a foreign citizen was not automatically a Japanese citizen, unlike
96 Miller, supra note 5, at 202.
97 Knapp, supra note 23, at 166.

98 See Mami, supra note 73, at 72.
99 Miller, supra note 5, at 175. See also Mami, supra note 73, at 69.
100 Equal Employment Opportunity Law, Law No. 113 of 1972, as amended by Law No. 92 of 1997
[hereinafter
1997 EEOL].
English translation
available at http://www.jil.go.jp/laborinfoe/docs/llj law4.pdf (last visited May 7, 2004). See IWASAWA, supra note 43, at 216.
1o1 1997 EEOL, supra note 100, arts. 5-6.
102 IWASAWA, supra note 43, at 218.
103 For further analysis of the 1997 EEOL, see Miller, supra note 5, at 203-207. See also Jennifer S.
Fan, From Office Ladies to Women Warriors?: The Effect of The EEOL on Japanese Women, 10 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 103 (1999); Robert Larsen, Ryousai Kenb6 Revisited: The Future of Gender Equality in
Japan After the 1997 Equal Employment Opportunity Law, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV 189
(2001).
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a child born of the converse parentage. 10 4 In addition, naturalization was
easier for immigrants married to Japanese men than for those married to
Japanese women.' 0 5 These provisions respectively violated Articles 9(2) and
9(1) of CEDAW, which require equal rights for women "with respect to the
nationality of their children" and equal rights "to acquire, change or retain
their nationality."' 6 The Japanese government subsequently recognized the
need to amend the Nationality Law, and did so in 1985, the same year it
ratified CEDAW.1' 7 As the amendment to the Nationality Law of 1950
demonstrates, CEDAW's ability to prompt legal changes necessary to
achieve gender equality in Japan is beyond that of the Japanese Constitution.
B.

Subsequent Legislation Prompted by CEDA W Lacks Specificity and
Depth

Since the ratification of CEDAW, Japan has enacted numerous laws
designed to achieve gender equality.' 0 8 Legislative action has ranged from
nominal changes designed to enforce gender-neutral titles for health care
professionals' 0 9 to the comprehensive, such as the Basic Law for a GenderEqual Society ("Basic Law"), which establishes principles for achieving
gender equality in Japan. 1 0 Such legislation indicates that the Japanese
government is attempting to guide its society toward gender equality."'

104 Nationality
505 Nationality

Law, Law No. 147 of 1950, art. 2. See IWASAWA, supra note 43, at 226.
Law, Law No. 147 of 1950, arts. 6-7.

06 IWASAWA, supra note 43, at 227-28.

107Id. at 226-27. Ministry of Justice
officials maintained that the amendment was not required under
the Japanese Constitution, for a few years earlier, the Tokyo High Court had held that unequal standards for
men and women in attaining nationality were constitutional. 33 GYOSEI JIKEN SAIBAN REISH0 1374
(Tokyo Dist. Ct., Mar. 30, 1981). See IWASAWA, supra note 43, at 227-28. Although the court recognized
that the requirements for nationality were not "entirely reasonable," the court nonetheless found that the
Nationality Act of 1950 was not "excessively unreasonable" and, therefore, constitutional. Id. at 227.
58 Although CEDAW is the only legal instrument that compels Japan to adopt gender equality
legislative measures, the feminist movement in Japan should also be credited with prompting this
legislation. See Yoko, supra note 67, at 82. The pressure exerted by Japanese feminists was also
instrumental in compelling Japan's ratification of CEDAW. Id.
'09 Hokenshi Josanshi Kangoshiho No Ichibu Wo Kaisei Sum H6tsu [Law Concerning Partial
Amendment to the Law of Public Health Nurses, Midwives and Nurses] Law No. 153 of 2001. See Fifth
Periodic Report of Japan, supra note 6, at 14.
", Basic Law for a Gender-Equal Society, Law No. 78 of 1999. English translation available at
http://www.gender.go.jp/english/basiclaw/index.htm (last visited May 6, 2003).
1 The true motivations of the Japanese government remain unclear. It is suggested that Japan's
adherence to international human rights law is part of "a program of kokusika (internationalization) to
counteract its xenophobic global image and cultivate an international outlook in Japanese society that is
commensurate with Japan's economic power." PORT, supra note 45, at 840. If this were correct, it would
seem that Japan is perfunctorily abiding by CEDAW and gender equality is not its true goal.
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1
This guidance, however, is tentative, perhaps even reluctant in character. 2
Japan's gender equality legislation often lacks a concrete course of action to
achieve its goals. 1 As Japan's Basic Law and the Law for the Prevention of
Spousal Violence and the Protection of Victims ("Law on Spousal
Violence") demonstrate, without precise guidance for action, the efficacy of
legislation is undermined.

1.

The Basic Law for a Gender-EqualSociety Fails to Specify a Course
ofAction

Enacted in 1999, the Basic Law provides general guidelines for
achieving gender equality at each level of the Japanese government, but fails
to provide definite steps for implementing those guidelines. The Basic Law
identifies the following elements as essential to achieving gender equality:
respect for the human rights of women and men, analysis of social systems
or practices, joint participation of men and women in planning and deciding
policies, equal responsibilities
in family life and other activities, and
14
international cooperation.'
The Basic Law also identifies the respective responsibilities of the
national government, local governments, and ordinary citizens.1 15 It requires
the national government and each prefecture' 16 to establish a basic plan for
12

Even when a consensus has been reached, the government is slow to change its laws.

For

instance, Article 750 of the Civil Code currently requires each married couple to share the same surname.
Suvendrini Kakuchi, In Japan, Women Continue to Struggle to Change the Law to Allow Married Women
to Retain Their Maiden Name, INTERPRESS SERVICE, Sept. 6, 2001, RDS Contemporary Women's Issues
3064426. Although there are no legal impediments to the couple assuming the women's surname, 98% of
all couples assume the name of the husband's family. Id. The remaining 2% accounts for when the bride's
family has no male descendents and her husband takes her surname to continue the patriarchal line.
IWASAWA, supra note 43, at 233. In a May 2001 survey, most respondents indicated that they supported
married couples being able to have different names, such that women could retain their maiden names.
NGOs' Answers, supra note 5, at 29. Yet, two years later, the bill to amend the Civil Code, which was
introduced to the Diet in 1996, has not been enacted. Id.
113 In the recent review of the Fifth Periodic Report of Japan, the Committee asked the Japanese
delegates about how various gender equity goals were going to be achieved, and the delegates had no
answer. See Committee Press Release, supra note 18. For example, there was no plan as to how to attain
the goal of increasing the number of elected officials who are women to at least 30% by the year 2010. Id.
The delegates could only confirm that there were no affirmative action measures in place to achieve the
goal. Id. They also indicated that the Japanese people did not approve of government action, such as quota
systems, aimed to improve the position of Japanese women in society, viewing this action as reverse
discrimination against Japanese men. Id.
114 Basic Law for a Gender-Equal Society, supra note 110, arts. 3-7.
See also Fifth Periodic Report
of Japan, supra note 6, at 17.
...Basic Law for a Gender-Equal Society, supra note 110, arts. 8-10.
16 Japan is divided into forty-seven prefectures, which are regional divisions with their own system
of local government.
Japan Local Government Center (JLGC), Local Government in Japan, at
http://www.jlgc.org/japan/local.htm (last visited March 28, 2004).
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attaining a gender equal society,1 17 and it also recommends each
municipality develop its own plan to reach that goal." 18 Crucially, the Basic
Law establishes that the national government should" 19 take "positive
action" to fulfill its responsibility to "comprehensive[ly] formulat[e] and
implement[ ] policies" that will create a gender equal society. 20 Under this
provision, the national government should not merely suppress
discriminatory action, but also creatively work to develop a society of equal
opportunities, rights, and freedoms. However, government officials may be
able to interpret the Basic Law as merely imposing a duty to take
"reasonably necessary" positive action.' 2'
Similar interpretations
demonstrate that a reasonableness requirement
has the potential to
22
undermine the spirit of the entire provision. 1
The Basic Law further provides that citizens "shall make efforts to
contribute to [the] formation of a Gender-Equal Society in all areas of
society, including workplaces, schools, the local community and the
home."' 123 Although this duty does not give rise to a cause of action, 24 it
indicates that the government recognizes the role of individual citizens in
achieving gender equality. Because social change is accomplished by the
collective action of individuals, 125 consciousness-raising must be a
117 Basic Law for a Gender-Equal Society, supra note 110, arts. 13, 14.

See Fifth Periodic Report of

Japan, supra note 6, at 17.
I18Basic Law for a Gender-Equal Society, supra note 110, art. 14, para. 3.
"9 Here, "should" is probably more accurate than "must." The Basic Law does not expressly
mandate that the government must take positive action. Rather, the reference to positive action is in
parentheses, as follows: "The State is responsible for the comprehensive formulation and implementation
of policies related to promotion of formation of a Gender-equal Society (including positive action. The
same shall apply hereinafter.) pursuant to the basic principles on formation of a Gender-equal Society
prescribed in Articles 3 to 7[.]" Id. art. 8. Given the general trend of Japanese law, the parenthetical most
likely means that the government should take positive action. This is the most lenient interpretation.
20 Id. art. 8. Positive action is defined as "[p]ositive provision of the opportunities stipulated [in the
Basic Law] to either women or men within the necessary limits in order to redress gender disparities in
terms of such opportunities." Id. art. 2, para. 2. Positive action should be distinguished from affirmative
action implemented in the United States to combat racial and sexual discrimination, which now has a
negative connotation.. Positive action is used in the philosophical sense to distinguish it from negative
restraints. A law that compels positive action requires a person or entity to perform a particular action. For
instance, a justice system that requires the tortfeasor to remunerate the plaintiff is compelling positive
action from the tortfeasor. Conversely, a law that imposes a negative restraint instructs persons or entities
to refrain from executing a particular action. For instance, the ancient prohibition, "Thou shalt not kill," is
a negative restraint.
121The Basic Law's definition of positive action, includes the proviso "within the necessary limits."
ld.
122 See supra Part II.B.
123 Basic Law for a Gender-Equal Society, supra note 110, art. 10.
124This duty may be similar to the "duty to endeavor" imposed by the 1985 EEOL on private
employers. See supra Part I.A. 1.
'2i For additional discussion of the individual's role in social change, see infra Part V.B.
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fundamental part of initiating gender equality. 126 In their daily lives,
Japanese citizens either perpetuate or deviate from androcentric social
norms. Thus, each individual needs to be aware of his or her complicity in
social systems of inequality, and thereby given the opportunity to decide
whether to embrace or resist the patriarchal status quo. 27 Under the Basic
Law, the Japanese government clearly encourages individuals to deviate
from androcentric norms.
Nevertheless, the Basic Law fails to provide a concrete course of
action for the attainment of gender equality. The government claims that the
2000,121
Basic Plan for a Gender-Equal Society, approved by the cabinet in
29
By setting out such
details concrete measures to achieve gender equality.
however, the
officials,
measures in a document created by bureaucratic
130
government conceals its precise plan of action from the public.
2.

Japan s Law for the Prevention of Spousal Violence and the Protection
of Victims Does Not Cover All Aspects of Domestic Violence

Enacted in April 2001, l3! the Law on Spousal Violence was the first
132
legislative effort to address the problem of domestic violence in Japan.
126As applied in the feminist context, consciousness-raising requires critical thinking about one's
own conduct and realizing how it is influenced by and perpetuates androcentric norms. See Kathie
Sarachild, Consciousness-Raising:A Radical Weapon, in FEMINIST REVOLUTION 144 (Kathie Sarachild ed.,
1978).
1827Thus, it is important for the government
to establish public outreach efforts that promote
the
critical reflection required by consciousness-raising. See infra Part V.B.
28 Fifth Periodic Report of Japan, supra note 6, at 18.
129The statement was made in its report to the Committee as follows: "11 important objectives were
set out together with long-term policy directions up to the year 2010 and concrete measures to be
implemented by the end of FY 2005 for each of them [in the Basic Plan]." Id.
130A summary of the Basic Plan for a Gender-Equal Society is published, but it merely lists the
government's specific objectives without providing how they will be achieved. The only action suggested
is conducting surveys or reviewing existing practices. Headquarters for the Promotion of Gender Equality,
Basic Plan for Gender Equality, available at http://www.gender.go.jp/women200l/n5.html (last visited
May 6, 2004).
"' Fifth Periodic Report of Japan, supra note 6, at 13.
32 Thirty percent of all divorces in Japan are initiated in direct response to physical violence. Id. at
177. Mental abuse accounts for another twenty-five percent of divorces. Id. One in twenty women has
admitted to experiencing violence from a spouse or partner that made them fear for their lives. Id. at 25.
Although there is no article in CEDAW that explicitly addresses violence against women, in 1992, the
Committee confirmed that violence that either targets women because of their gender or affects women
disproportionately constitutes gender discrimination. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, General Recommendation 19 on Violence Against Women, Report of the Committee on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 47h Sess., U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1992), available at
See also
(last visited May 7, 2004).
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recomm.htm
MACKINNON, supra note 36, at 48. In addition, Article 16 mandates equality between men and women in
marriage and family relations. CEDAW, supra note 12, art. 16. Accordingly, Japan's Law on Spousal
Violence can be seen as complying with CEDAW.
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Although this law provides a welcome system of protection for domestic
violence victims, it remains inadequate.' 33 The statutes' three basic elements
each have serious limitations.
First, the statute requires prefectures to establish counseling centers
that also function as shelters for victims of domestic violence. Although the
national government partially subsidizes these centers,' 34 the statute does not
require prefectures to establish a center in every municipality. 35 If a
prefecture establishes only one center within its jurisdiction, it will have
fulfilled the literal requirements of the law. 36 The statute should be
amended to require a specific number of shelters per capita or a fixed
number of shelters in order to ensure that all women have access to these
valuable services.
The Law on Spousal Violence also establishes guidelines for reporting
37
abuse, but these guidelines are weakened by their voluntary character.
The statute does not impose a legal duty on individuals (including
physicians, medical personnel, and social workers) to report persons
suspected of being victims of spousal violence. 38 The law simply provides
that these persons "should endeavor" to report the victim to the local
counseling center and provide information to suspected victims.,
At a
minimum, health care professionals should be required to refer suspected
victims to a counseling center. Without information about the existing
support system, these women cannot exercise their choice to use the
services. In addition, it is important for health care workers to provide
information about local counseling centers, because a belief that their
problem is personal or shameful
may prevent domestic violence victims
140
from seeking help on their own.
Finally, the statute develops a limited system of protective orders.
Only when a wife, but not a girlfriend, faces a "grave threat ... constituting
significant harm to life or bodily conditions" can a court issue a protective
order. 14 1 In the case of a wife who is no longer residing in the home she
"' See Part III.A. 1 regarding the voluntarism and resulting inadequacy of the 1985 EEOL.
1"4 Id. art. 28.
...Id. art. 3.
136 See id.
137 Law for the Prevention of Spousal Violence and Protection of Victims, Law No. 31 of 2001, art. 3.
English translation available at http://www.gender.go.jp/dv/sv.pdf (last visited May 6, 2004).
"8 Id. art. 6. Nor do these individuals have the duty to provide suspected victims with information
about counseling services. Id.
139Id. art. 6, paras. 1, 4.

140 See WOMEN: IMAGES AND REALITY, supra note 36, at 423.

141Law for the Prevention of Spousal Violence and Protection of Victims, Law No. 31 of 2001, art.
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once shared with her husband, the judge may enter a six-month protective
142
When the
order prohibiting the husband from approaching the premises.
for two
valid
is
order
protective
the
home,
same
the
share
husband and wife
143
to
application
its
extending
by
improved
be
should
This system
weeks.
are
who
women
all
that
so
abusers,
their
to
women who are not married
abused by romantic partners may be protected. Removing the requirements
of "grave threat" and "significant bodily harm," which may be interpreted by
judges as authorizing protective orders in only heinous cases of physical
abuse, would additionally strengthen the statute. 144
The Basic Law and the Law on Spousal Violence are two of the
145
Japan's
statutes that Japan has recently enacted to comply with CEDAW.
legislative efforts seem to demonstrate dedication to the goal of gender
equality. Yet, the weak enforcement provisions of such legislation also
confirm the Japanese government's adherence to its method of rule by
consensus. 46 In the absence of social consensus, legislation that is
47
Thus, the Japanese
characterized by voluntarism cannot be effective.
government cannot rely exclusively on legislation to achieve gender
equality. Rather, additional action, such as may be performed by the new
administrative agencies dedicated to gender issues, will be necessary.
Institutional Changes Prompted by CEDAW Do Not Result in
Substantive PoliticalAction

C.

In complying with CEDAW, Japan has created a variety of
administrative agencies focused on gender equality, but these agencies do
48
In
not have the authority to implement the policies they recommend.
2001, the Council for Gender Equality ("Council"), composed of twelve
ministers and twelve experts appointed by the prime minister, was
142 Id. art. 10, para. 1.
'43

Id. art. 10, para. 2.

1" For instance, a judge might consider bruising permissible, because only broken bones are
considered "significant bodily harm." Also, if a threat is conveyed over the phone, rather than in person, it
might not be considered grave. In its July review, the Committee further recommended that the statute
expand the definition of violence to include non-physical abuse. Report, supra note 20.
'45 For a list of these statutes, see Fifth Periodic Report of Japan, supra note 6, at 12-14.
146 For discussion of Japan's rule by consensus, see supra Part I and infra Part V.A.2.
141 See infra Part V.A.2.
148 The Committee recommends States Parties to develop "effective national machinery" that are
wholly dedicated to the goal of gender equality. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, General Recommendation No. 6 on Effective National Machinery and Publicity, Report of the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 7th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/43/38 (1988),
(last visited May 7, 2004)
available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recomm.htm
[Recommendation 6].
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established within the Cabinet Office. 49 The Council is responsible for
monitoring the government's progress in establishing a gender equal society,
surveying the results of the government's measures, and recommending
However, the Council's ability to supervise the
basic policies. 50
government's efforts is limited, as it convenes only four times a year.15'
Most notably, contrary to the Committee's recommendation,' 52 the Council
does not execute the policies it develops. Therefore, the Council has no
authority to effectuate actual gender equality.
Similarly, the Gender Equality Bureau ("Bureau"), also established
within the Cabinet Office in 2001, has a facilitating, rather than active,
role. 53 The Bureau formulates plans for achieving gender equality,
coordinates the government's efforts, and promotes public awareness of
those efforts as well as the general principles necessary to achieve the goal
of gender equality. 54 Effectively acting as a public relations office, the
Bureau generally does not implement policies. 55 The Bureau, however,
could include consciousness-raising activities within its public outreach
efforts, and thereby
56 become an integral part of Japan's efforts to achieve
gender equality.'
Even though Japan has created administrative agencies to address the
issue of gender equality, 57 these agencies do not have the authority to take
the positive action that is required to effectively facilitate the creation of a
149 Fifth Periodic Report of Japan, supra note 6, at 15. The Cabinet Office is "the administrative
body responsible for carrying out planning and overall coordination of policies among ministries from a
higher position within the government structure." Id.
15 Id. The following committees have been established under the Council for Gender Equality:
Specialist Committee on Basic Issues, Specialist Committee on Violence Against Women, Specialist
Committee on Monitoring and Handling Complaints, and Specialist Committee on Surveying Effects. Id.
These committees are responsible for studying their respective fields, and then issuing a report that may
include recommendations for the government. NGOs 'Answers, supra note 5, at 2.
151NGOs'Answers, supra note 5, at 2.
1
Recommendation 6, supra note 148 (suggesting that institutions be given the authority to "help
formulate new policies and effectively carry out strategies and measures to eliminate discrimination").
153 See Fifth Periodic Report of Japan, supra note
6, at 15-16.
'54 Id. at 16.
1'5 Although a public outreach program can be considered a government policy if it is engineered to
convey particular messages, the Bureau seems to be merely a news service, providing information about the
government's activities.
See generally Gender Equality Bureau, Gender Information Site,
http://www.gender.go.jp/english-contents/index.html (last visited May 21, 2004).
156 See supra Part III.B.1 for a discussion of the importance of consciousness-raising
in achieving
gender equality in Japan.
157 In addition, the Chief Cabinet Secretary was given the additional responsibility of being
Minister
for Gender Equality, a position among the "Ministers of State for Special Missions" in the Cabinet Office.
Fifth Periodic Report of Japan, supra note 6, at 16. The new agencies coexist with the Headquarters for the
Promotion of Gender Equality, composed of the Prime Minister, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, and all
Cabinet Ministers, in addition to the Liaison Conference for the Promotion of Gender Equality, which
facilitates communication between NGOs, the government, and the public. Id.
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more gender equal Japan. The power to implement affirmative measures, as
the Diet.' 58

or
required by CEDAW, ultimately rests with the prime minister

Yet, these state actors have not thus far used their power to comprehensively
address the issue of gender equality. Accordingly, Japan has failed to

become a gender equal society.
IV.

THE

POSITION

OF WOMEN

IN CONTEMPORARY

JAPANESE

SOCIETY

REVEALS THAT GENDER EQUALITY REMAINS A DISTANT REALITY

Despite

Japan's efforts to comply with CEDAW, significant

differences in the position of men and women in Japanese society still
exist. 59 In the realm of education, family, and employment, Japanese

60
The fact that
women continue to assume traditionally female roles.'
in their low
reflected
is
Japanese women were not traditionally scholars
recently as
As
participation rates in more academically rigorous programs.
90%
nearly
but
2001, women accounted for only 37% of university students,
16
and
men
by
of junior college students. ' In addition, the subjects studied
162 The most
women at the university level are divided along gender lines.
popular fields of study for female university students are home economics,
humanities, and education, which more closely conform to women's
traditional caretaking and domestic roles.' 63 As of 2001, only 25% of female
in science courses, and a mere 10%
university students were enrolled
1 64

attended engineering classes.

1' For additional information about the structure of the Japanese government, see JOHN OWEN
HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARADOX 139-144 (1991).
" Fifth Periodic Report of Japan, supra note 6, at 103-127 (illustrating disparities between men and
women in education, employment, family life through demographic trends).
'60 Socialization rather than an essentialist view of men and women explains the different roles that
women perform in contemporary Japanese society. A woman's identity is constructed around what is
viewed as the traditional role of women in Japanese culture. See JOANNA LIDDLE & SACHIKO NAKAJIMA,
RISING SUNS, RISING DAUGHTERS: GENDER, CLASS AND POWER IN JAPAN 11 (2000). Rather than
questioning this social construction, most Japanese women embrace it, as exemplified by the dominance of
"housewife feminism" in the Japanese women's movement. See id. at 10- 11. A more critical Japanese
feminist, Matsui Yayori, explains that the social factors of "a conformist educational system, material
affluence, and a culture of mass consumption" undermine women's consciousness of their social role and
of social issues in general. See Matsui Yayori, The Women 's Movement. Progress and Obstacles in
VOICES FROM THE JAPANESE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT, supra note 67, at 32.
16' Fifth Periodic Report of Japan, supra note 6, at 104. Junior colleges in Japan have been called
"bride-preparatory school[s]," as they are used to increase women's ability to marry well by being
educated. ROSENBERGER, supra note 2, at 141. Therefore, junior colleges are less rigorous academically,
and graduates usually do not intend to seek corporate careers.
'62 Id. at 106.
163 Id. (94% of female enrollees study home economics, 67% humanities, 60% education).

164 Id.
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The gender-based discrepancies in these statistics indicate that
women's educational choices are being heavily influenced either by social
pressures or the absence of employment opportunities.' 65 Insofar as
women's decisions in the field of education are constrained by
discriminatory social and employment practices, these decisions are not
made freely. The right to pursue education is arguably a fundamental
freedom, protected by Article 1 of CEDAW. 166 In addition, constraints on
women's educational choices can be seen as impermissible effects of sociocultural and
employment discrimination, which are clearly prohibited by
67
CEDAW. 1
Within the family, women continue to bear nearly all the
responsibility for domestic chores and family obligations, in direct violation
of Article 16 of CEDAW, which provides that men and women have the
same rights and responsibilities during marriage.168 As a result, women of
childbearing age continue to have very low participation in the work
force. 169 After quitting a job to raise children, most women will return to
low-paying part-time or temporary positions. 170 If her employer does not
voluntarily provide daycare facilities, a mother with young children may not
be able to retain a career-track position. 171 In this employment system,
women continue to confront difficult decisions regarding careers and
children, even after the 1997 EEOL.
Furthermore, the slowly changing society in which Japanese women
today live conflicts with CEDAW in at least two respects. First, although
the choice to live outside the traditional female gender role is now available,
Japanese women risk their virtue in exercising this choice. 72 Women who
choose to pursue careers rather than 1marriage
and motherhood are viewed as
selfish, unfeminine or "headstrong."' 73 When they do not conform to ryOsai
165If there is no possibility of finding employment in a given field, one usually will not pursue a

degree in that field. Thus, when only 3% of career track jobs are held by women, women will adjust their
chosen field of study accordingly. Fifth Periodic Report of Japan, supra note 6, at 103.
66 CEDAW, supra note 12, art. I (guaranteeing women the exercise of fundamental freedoms).
'67 Article 5 prohibits cultural practices that discriminate against women.
CEDAW, supra note 12,
art. 5. Article 11 prohibits discrimination in the field of employment. CEDAW, supranote 12, art. 11.
168 CEDAW, supra note 12, art. 16(c). See also, Marsha A. Freeman, The Human Rights of Women in
the Family: Issues and Recommendations for Implementation of the Women's Convention, in WOMEN'S
RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 149, 158-59 (Julie Peters & Andrea
Wolper ed., 1995).
169 When graphed according to age, women's participation in employment creates an M-shaped
curve. Miller, supra note 5, at 166. See also Fifth Periodic Report of Japan, supranote 6, at 103.
1 0 See NGOs'Answers, supra note 5, at 11.
:71See Miller, supra note 5, at 166.
72 See ROSENBERGER, supra note 2, at 1-2.
113Id. at 186. See also Knapp, supra note 23, at 160 (quoting Furuuchi Masaru, personnel director of
one of the largest bookstores in Japan, who in response to the question why the company did not hire
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kenbo, women are considered deviant or marginal by the conservative
174
Conversely, female
majority, which is decreasing but still influential.

caregivers, who behave more consistently with traditional Japanese ideals,
175
This divergent treatment
are viewed as compassionate, virtuous women.
women to perform
compel
to
mechanism
social
operates as a powerful
exists in most
conform
to
pressure
social
Although
traditional gender roles.
functions to
it
when
CEDAW
of
5
Article
cultures, the mechanism violates
176
roles.
stereotypical
in
remain
to
women
encourage
Additionally, women's development of dual selves--one to
correspond to a public face and one that is the private, true self-conflicts
177
Women
with CEDAW's comprehensive guarantee of liberty for women.
who
women
dutiful
of
in contemporary Japan outwardly project the image
to
freedom
the
emulate ryosai kenbo, while privately allowing themselves
78
For instance,
deviate from conservative conceptions of feminine duty.'
some Japanese women no longer address their husbands in the traditional
of their homes. 179
manner as either "master" or "father" while in the privacy
Yet, these women generally revert back to using these traditional terms when
in the presence of non-family members, particularly their husbands' coworkers and employers. 80 Using the distinction between public and private
in this way preserves conservative social norms, providing the illusion that
traditional customs remain firmly rooted. As expressly stated in Article 5,
CEDAW stands to dissolve the cultural obstacles that prevent women from
will
becoming openly independent. 18' Within a gender equal society, women
public realm.1 82
be able to exercise the right of self-expression in the

female university graduates, stated: "[they] tend to stop working after a few years. And quite frankly, we

find them rather headstrong.").

174 ROSENBERGER, supra note 2, at 222 (explaining that women who choose not to marry still
experience marginalization, although less than in the past). In an interview with Nancy Rosenberger, a
single woman in her early thirties stated: "You have to be a woman in a box-an ideal pattern-and then

Id.
men spoil
5 you and women approve."

17 See id. at 2, 161.
176CEDAW, supra note 12, art. 5(a) ("States Parties shall take all appropriate measures ... [t]o
modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the
elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the
inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women[.]").
177ROSENBERGER, supra note 2, at 2. CEDAW, supra note 12, art. 1.
178 ROSENBERGER, supra note 2, at 2-3.
179 Id. at 155-56. While in the home, some women preferred to address their husbands as uchi no
otoosan (father of the house) and others referred to their husbands by their family names. Id.
io Id.
181 CEDAW, supra note 12, art. 5(a).
182 The right of self-expression should be a fundamental freedom protected by Article I of CEDAW.
See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
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In spite of the government's efforts to comply with CEDAW,
contemporary Japanese society still retains many forces that undermine
CEDAW's objectives. Because these efforts have not been sufficient to
achieve actual gender equality, Japan should alter its approach to
implementing CEDAW.
V.

THE UNCERTAIN ROAD TO REAL CHANGE IN JAPANESE SOCIETY:

How

JAPAN CAN REALIZE CEDAW's IDEAL OF GENDER EQUALITY

Japanese society appears to be posed on the verge of great social
change in gender relations, for social attitudes about women appear to be
evolving.' 3 Unfortunately, given the persistent nature of patriarchy and
cultural justifications for gender inequalities, Japan may maintain this
position for generations. Without stronger government action, the dual
forces of socialization and individual choice will determine social practices
regarding gender in Japan. This uncertain route to gender equality is
contrary to CEDAW, which requires Japan to take positive action 8 4 to
achieve universal gender equality.18 5 In order to comply with CEDAW,
Japan cannot simply wait for gender equality to occur; it must actively guide
its citizens toward a gender equal society. Because of its proclivity to
govern through consensus, Japan must take measures to build a new social
consensus that fully supports gender equality. Thus, the first task of the
Japanese government should be to deconstruct conservative attitudes toward
gender relations that preserve the unequal status quo.
A.

UnderminingJapan's CulturalLegitimization of Gender Inequality

Under Article 5 of CEDAW, the Japanese government has the
obligation to work toward changing social customs and institutions that
obstruct the realization of gender equality.'8 6 Thus far, however, Japan
appears to have largely neglected this obligation.' 87 The government should
critically evaluate the cultural justifications conservatives offer to maintain
the status quo. To do so, the Japanese government should counter historical
justifications of gender inequality.188 The government should also assess its
See generally ROSENBERGER, supra note 2. See also supra note 174 and accompanying text.
CEDAW, supra note 12, art. 2. See also supra note 119 and accompanying text.
:83 CEDAW, supra note 12, art. 1.
I6Id. art. 5(a).
87 See supra Part IV.
a5 In the name of history, Japanese women are relegated to the domestic role of wife and mother,
even though the majority of women throughout Japanese history worked alongside their husbands. Anne
183
84
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commitment to the cultural values of harmony and consensus-values

conservative politicians rely on to preserve the status quo.' 89 In order to
comply with CEDAW, the government must take affirmative measures to
ensure that its rule by consensus does not hinder the goal of gender equality;
Japan must transcend cultural justifications for inequality.
1.

Historical Alternatives Should Be Used to Challenge the Cultural
Justificationfor the Subjugation of Women in JapaneseSociety

Although, as in most cultures, Japan has a history of gender
inequality, there are also different social practices within this history that
support CEDAW's objectives. In different eras, Japanese women were
accorded different rights.1 90 The system of honor and patriarchy 91 that is
recognized as "traditional" by contemporary Japanese was only created by
Tokugawa shoguns in the 1600s. 192 Under this hierarchical system, women
were deprived of legal and economic rights.' 93 In addition, Tokugawa
sensibilities concerning feminine modesty prevented women from appearing
in public. 194 This feminine ideal, however, was created with reference to the
wives and daughters of the elite samurai class,' 95 who comprised a mere six
percent of Japanese society.' 96 Commoner women did not remain indoors,
for they worked in their fields alongside their husbands. 197 According to
popular poetry during this period, commoner women were virtually equal to
their husbands within their own family.' 98 Thus, the contemporary Japanese
conception of traditional gender roles is based on customs that applied to an
under-representative minority of women during one period of their extensive

Walthall, Devoted Wives/Unruly Women: Invisible Presence in the History of JapaneseSocial Protest,20
SIGNS 106, 111 (1994).
189 UPHAM, supra note 23, at 2 (describing the position which "dismiss[es] the cultural explanations

[of Japan's undeveloped legal system] as a politically convenient myth used by Japanese elites to legitimate
the suppression of conflict"). See also infra Part V.A.2.
For a brief history, see Ryosuke Ishii, The Status of Women in TraditionalJapanese Society, 29
JAPANESE ANN. INT'LL. 10 (1986).
191Walthall, supra note 188, at 108.
192 Id. at 108. See also ROSENBERGER, supra note 2, at 7.
193 Walthall, supra note 188, at 108. For instance, all household property was inherited patrilineally.
Id. In a patrilineal system of inheritance, property passes only from father to son, or the next closest male
descendant to the patriarch, or head of the household.
194Walthall, supra note 188, at 108, 110.
'9' Id. at 111.
196 ROSENBERGER, supra note 2, at 7.
197 Walthall, supra note 188, at 111.

198Id.
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history.' 99

Before the Tokugawa, or Edo, period, women had greater political,
legal and economic rights. In the archaic period of Jodai, there were female
sovereigns. 2°° By contrast, the Imperial House Law in contemporary Japan
specifies that the emperor must be male, ensuring that there will be no more
ruling empresses. 201 Also during the Jodai period, husbands either went to
live with their wives or constructed new homes,20 2 rather than wives
assuming a place in their husbands' ancient family home, as in the Tokugawa
period. This practice suggests that Jodai households were less patriarchal
than households in present-day Japan. 203 Also, in the subsequent Josei5
20 4
period, women were allotted farmland and retained their family name.
Today, however, the Japanese Civil Code requires married couples to share
the same surname,
effectively compelling women to assume their husbands'
20 6
family name.
The various rights and liberties Japanese women have held throughout
history provide ample cultural examples that the current government can use
to help create a more equal role for contemporary women. Although the
conservative majority has employed gender-based ideals of the Edo period
to justify current gender inequalities, the government should develop a
campaign that emphasizes different aspects of Japan's history. In public
outreach and consciousness-raising efforts,20 7 government agencies could
help the public understand that their culture and history are more diverse and
egalitarian than commonly conceived. The reality of Japan's diverse history
undermines the current conservative consensus that feminism threatens
99 For further explorations of the status of women in Japanese history, see RECREATING JAPANESE
WOMEN, 1600-1945 (Gail Lee Bernstein, ed., 1991); JAPANESE WOMEN: NEW FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON
THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE (Kumiko Fujimura-Fanselow & Atsuko Kameda, eds., 1995); WOMEN
AND CLASS IN JAPANESE HISTORY (Hitomi Tonomura, et al., eds., 1999).
200 See Ishii, supra note 190, at 12.
201 Imperial House Law, Law No. 3 (1947), c. I, art. I (stating "[tihe Imperial throne shall be

succeeded to by male descendants in the male line belonging to the Imperial lin[eage.") The dearth of
males in the royal family has prompted discussions about amending this provision, but no bill has been
introduced to the Diet. Imperial Succession Debate Muted as Japan Awaits Baby, JAPAN POLICY &
POLITICS, Nov. 26, 2001, 2001 WL 31665479.
252 Ishii, supra note 190, at 11-12.

203Although the Tokugawa household system was officially abolished after World War II, remnants
of the system still exist in contemporary Japan. Third Reformation, supra note 69, at 22. For instance,
Japanese families continue to desire a male household head, as evidenced by a daughter's husband
assuming that position when there are no sons in the family. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
204Ishii, supra note 190, at 12.
25 Id. at 13.

206MINPO (Civil Code), art. 750. See also Kakuchi, supra note 112.
207Such efforts can satisfy the Japanese government's duty to take positive action to achieve gender
equality. Positive action does not have to be in the form of much-contested quota systems. See supra note
120 and accompanying text.
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traditional Japanese values.2 °8 In addition, a more complex understanding of
Japanese history de-stigmatizes alternate conceptions of a woman's proper
social role.
Thus, by criticizing conservatives' use of culture, the
government may make significant progress toward the goal of gender
equality. Similarly, Japan has much to gain by critically evaluating its
commitment to the traditional values of social harmony and consensus.
2.

The Government Cannot Allow the Cultural Values of Harmony and
Consensus to Impede the Goal of Gender Equality

By implementing gradual measures to achieve gender equality as
required by its rule by consensus, the Japanese government fails to meet its
obligations under CEDAW.2 °9
Japan's emphasis on consensus as a
prerequisite to social change 210 creates a social inertia that effectively
preserves the conservative status quo. 2 1 Although Japan does not have to
forsake its Confucian values, it must not allow them to obstruct Japan's
stated goal of attaining a gender equal society. The government must be
critical of politicians' use of supposed cultural values to preserve the status
quo, and it should be cognizant of the limitations of achieving CEDAW's
goals while preserving harmony and consensus. By gaining this awareness,
the government may more readily identify measures it should adopt to
comply with CEDAW.
Government officials' use of Confucian values is widely perceived as
a tool to further political objectives.212 Since the end of World War II, Japan
has been almost continuously ruled by the Liberal Democratic Party
208 For examples of the conservative view of the feminist goal of gender equality and the role of

CEDAW in achieving it, see Michiko Hasegawa, 'Danjo Koy6 Byddo H6' Wa Bunka No Seitaikei Wo
Hakaisuru [The Equal Employment Law Threatens Cultural Ecology], 99 CHuO KORON 78 (May 1984);
Taro Yayama, 'Danjo Koyd Byido H6' Wa Nihon Wo Tsubusu [The Equal Employment Law Will Destroy
Japan] 16 SHOKUN 240 (May 1984). See also IWASAWA, supra note 43, at 215.
209Knapp, supra note 23, at 145-46.
210 Id.
2 Every society has social and political institutions that seek to preserve the status quo. Japan is
unique in that it uses cultural values to oppose social change; however, the same political and economic
investments in the status quo belie Japan's cultural justifications. See infra note 214.
212 Robert L. Kidder & John A. Hostetler, Managing Ideologies: Harmony as Ideology in Amish and
Japanese Societies, 24 LAW & SOC'y REv. 895, 896 (1990) (asserting that in Japan "an informalist antilaw
ideology of harmony and consensus is deliberately promoted and sustained by leader elites who are
pursuing goals and using strategies that do not conform with the ideals they profess"). See also Chalmers
Johnson, The People Who Invented the Mechanical Nightingale, in SHOWA: THE JAPAN OF HIROHITO 71, 88
(Carol Gluck & Stephen R. Graubard eds., 1992) (stating "Japan is a .. . developmental state based on a
covert conservative alliance [who inter alia use cultural values] to keep the people docile and preoccupied
with nonessential matters"). See also Larsen, supra note 103, at 190 (maintaining that "the government has
used Confucian values in order to build support for ... policy agenda[s]").
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("LDP"), which, despite its name, is conservative and elitist.2" 3 The LDP
uses cultural values to justify its political decisions, concealing prosaic
political interests.21 4 It is these political interests, rather than Confucian
values, that are opposed to establishing a more gender equal society.215 In
this political regime, the invocation of harmony and consensus to defend
21 6
gradual measures to achieve gender equality must be considered critically.
Additionally, even if the government were to adopt the position that gradual
measures are necessary, it should develop a concrete plan of action that
incorporates the principle of gradualism. For instance, legislation can be
enacted that incrementally establishes greater protections for women's rights
and stronger enforcement.2t 7 Even though these measures would be gradual,
they would constitute positive action by the government, as required by
CEDAW and recommended by Japan's own Basic Law.
Rule by consensus limits Japan's ability to meet CEDAW's goals, and
Japan must strive to transcend these limitations. The purpose of consensusbased rule is to avoid social conflict by not imposing laws and policies on an
unsupportive populace.21 8 Although this principle is admirable, it does not
recognize justice as a reason to compel social change. 219 In addition,
without a pre-existing state of harmony, rule by consensus merely suppresses
conflict, ignoring minority groups, including feminists, and their demands
for social justice. Despite Japan's claim to be a harmonious society,220 it is
213

Sylvia Brown Hamano, Incomplete Revolutions and Not So Alien Transplants: The Japanese

Constitution and Human Rights, I U. PA. J. CONST. L. 415, 416 (1999).
214 Johnson, supra note 212, at 88 ("[T]he obstacles to basic change in Japan are almost never what
Japanese spokesmen say they are. What stands in the way is not the need for consensus .... [but] political
vested interests.").
215 Id.
216 It is not necessary to delve into ulterior governmental motives, however. It is sufficient to observe
that these motives probably exist, providing an additional reason why cultural justifications should not be
allowed to bar social change.
217 Such legislation would be more effective than statutes such as the 1985 EEOL, for women's
groups would not have to pressure the government to continually revise it. In the event that such a
comprehensive scheme is too difficult to negotiate, statutes could have sunset provisions that would force
the government to reevaluate their efficacy.
218 See Knapp, supra note 23, 145-46.
219 Government action without popular support may seem unwise, or even coercive and
undemocratic. The author of this Comment does not intend to suggest that the Japanese government needs
to tyrannically enforce CEDAW. Simply, in the conflict between conservatives who wish to sustain gender
inequality and international human rights standards, the author asserts that principles of justice and equality
should prevail.
12o To substantiate the myth that Japan is a nation of harmony and consensus, the
government points
to litigation rates that are lower than other industrialized nations. Upham, supra note 23, at 1-2. However,
lower litigation rates can also be explained by the fact that Japanese legislation provides for informal
dispute resolution rather than causes of action for potential litigants. Id. at 22. Upham also argues that by
siphoning power away from the legal system in order to maintain social control, the bureaucracy conceals
conflict. Id. at 17. Negotiations and compromises occur within private discussions between bureaucrats,
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not culturally homogenous 221 and minority groups were struggling for justice
and equality in Japan before any human rights treaties were ratified. 22 By
definition, Japan's rule by consensus does not adequately address minority
concerns, 223 which is particularly alarming in the context of human rights.
Although Japan may choose to uphold the cultural ideals of harmony and
under CEDAW,
consensus, it must also comply with its
224legal obligations
which requires social justice for women.
The simplest resolution of the conflict between the principles of
harmony and justice would be to provide a human rights exception to the
225
This approach, which would require Japan to abandon
rule by consensus.
its Confucian values when implementing CEDAW, is not likely to be
accepted by the Japanese government. Alternatively, Japan may maintain its
226
In
rule by consensus, but allow the government to foster that consensus.
this scheme, the government would transition from investigating what the
consensus is 227 to building a new consensus. This would allow the
government to maintain social harmony while fulfilling its obligations to
CEDAW. Thus, rather than merely assessing the attitudes of the citizenry,
its citizens so as to cultivate
the Japanese government should educate
228

attitudes that support gender equality.
The values of harmony and consensus do not foreclose the possibility
of gender equality in Japan. Rather, the government should seek creative
solutions within this cultural framework, not only when drafting legislation

politicians, and businessmen. Id. at 15-16. Contention in Japanese society is thereby veiled by the
seamless functioning of the bureaucracy. It should be noted that the myth of a satisfied consensus
marginalizes dissenting voices. If society were viewed as a continuum of different perspectives and
interests, women might not have to conceal their real selves from the public. See supra Part IV.
221 Lansing & Domeyer, supra note 1, at 141-44. See generally JAPAN'S MINORITIES: THE ILLUSION
OF HOMOGENEITY (Michael Weiner ed., 1997).
222 Hamano, supra note 213, 418-20.
22 It is the nature of Japan's rule by consensus to have political policies address the concerns of the
majority rather than any minority groups. See generally Lansing & Domeyer, supra note 1.
22 Although CEDAW does not use the term "social justice," the entire enterprise of securing equality
and liberty for women is grounded in principles of justice; women are entitled to the rights enumerated in
CEDAW by virtue of their human dignity. CEDAW, supra note 12, annex. Because it is unjust to deprive
a person of her natural entitlements, CEDAW secures justice as well as equality by protecting women's
rights.
225 Members of the Committee effectively adopt this position when saying inter alia to Japan
"changes of the civil code [are] not so much the matter of public opinion, but of obligations under the
Convention." See Committee Press Release, supra note 18.
226 As applied to gender equality, Japan's rule by consensus allows majority belief to influence
government action but overlooks the fact that government action can influence the social consensus. See
supra note 26 and accompanying text. In other arenas, the government has not been so shortsighted,
mobilizing the public through slogans and media campaigns. See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
227 See supra Part III.C.
228 See infra Part V.B. for further discussion.
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but also when instituting political policies. Throughout Japanese history, the
government has sought to mobilize its people for its own purposes.2 29 It
should apply similar efforts to creating a gender equal society.
B.

By All Appropriate Means: Japan Needs to Take Positive Action to
Achieve CEDAW's Goals

In order to achieve actual gender equality, Japan must do more than
enact legislation. CEDAW recognizes that law has severe limitations as a
method of initiating social change2 30 and therefore requires States Parties to
use any and all appropriate measures to achieve gender equality. 3' Changes
in law do not automatically result in social changes, which require individual
32
The
citizens to alter their behavior and ideological perspectives.
occur.2 33
to
needs
change
social
which
at
locus
the
is
individual
Consequently, law is always an uncertain means of achieving social change
because human beings are self-determining agents with deep psychological
reasons, CEDAW requires Japan to
commitments to custom. 234 For 23these
5
take measures beyond legislation.
In order to make gender equality in Japan a social reality, as required
by CEDAW, Japan should build the requisite consensus concerning
women's roles in society. Rather than studying what the consensus
229ROSENBERGER, supra note 2, at 18,

66-7,

127-130 (stating that government endorsed

"individualism" for women in order to promote consumerism in the 1980s and later encouraged middleaged women to have an "independent way of working" so that they could occupy part-time, temporary, and
contract positions in the 1990s). See also LIDDLE & NAKAJIMA, supra note 160, at 128 (discussing the
government transition from the slogan "Bear more children and increase the population" to "Build more
aeroplanes" in order to address its changing needs during World War II).
230 Kamiya, supra note 22, at 447. See also Berta Esperanza Hemandez-Truyol, Latinas, Culture and
Human Rights: A Modelfor Making Change, Saving Soul, 23 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 21, 33 (2001).
231 See supra Part II.A.
232Sachiko Kaneko, The Struggle for Legal Rights and Reforms: A Historical View, in JAPANESE
WOMEN: NEW FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE, supra note 199, at 1I.
233This assumption is apparent in an analysis of the effectiveness of law in the civil rights movement
in the United States, which includes a discussion of individual compliance with law. See HARRELL R.
RODGERS, JR. & CHARLES S. BULLOCK III, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE: CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS AND THEIR
CONSEQUENCES 182-85 (1972).
234Law, and indeed any other system including propaganda and the media, cannot completely
regulate individual belief and action.
235 Although law can prompt ideological change, it should be supplemented by additional government
action. In the case of the 1985 EEOL, even though it was accompanied by "a general acclimation to the
concept of equality within Japanese society," it still failed to achieve actual equality within the workplace.
Miller, supra note 5, at 198. In addition, Japan needs to go beyond legislative measures, because its use of
law without sanctions is often undermined by its consensus-based rule. Although voluntary legislation can
be effective in Japan, cultural values substitute as the enforcement mechanism. PORT, supra note 45, at 13.
Thus, because legislation prompted by CEDAW is not supported by a clear consensus, statutes without
sanctions will not be completely effective, as illustrated by the 1985 EEOL.
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currently is, 236 the Japanese government should proactively create a
consensus that supports women's rights to autonomy and self-determination.
Japan's Gender Equality Bureau, which already is responsible for increasing
the public's awareness of the government's efforts to achieve gender
equality, should develop a media campaign designed to change conservative
attitudes toward gender roles.237 Education programs for youth should also
be a vital part of this consciousness-raising campaign. Also, the government
should mobilize its citizenry by developing slogans that promote a more
gender equal Japan.238 Furthermore, rather than focusing solely on the
rhetoric should also
values of harmony and consensus, the government's
239
equality.
and
justice
of
principles
the
invoke
CONCLUSION

IV.

Although Japan has made legislative and administrative changes in

order to comply with CEDAW, it has not achieved actual gender equality.
Neither has its efforts fully created legal equality for women. 240 The
contemporary social reality of Japan is far from the gender equal society
conceived by CEDAW, which entitles women to actual equality in the
political, economic, legal, domestic, educational, and cultural aspects of life.
In Japan, the traditional values of consensus and harmony are the
primary impediments to achieving gender equality. The government's rule
by consensus has stymied legislative efforts to provide equality for women.
Although the Japanese government does not have to renounce its Confucian
ideals, it is obligated under CEDAW, as well as its own Basic Law, to take
positive action to initiate gender equality. Because the absence of consensus
constrains legislative and political action, the government should act to
cultivate a new consensus that embraces the ideal of a gender equal society.
Without reinforcement by cultural values, the government's legislation and
policies cannot fully succeed. Thus, the Japanese government should
implement consciousness-raising programs, educating the public about
women's issues.
Under CEDAW, the Japanese government's efforts have positioned
Japan at the verge of creating a truly gender equal society. Social attitudes
236

See supra Part III.C. See also supra note 5 and accompanying text.

237Many

of the government's own officials will have to change their attitudes toward women. See

Kakuchi, supra note 112. An interviewee characterized male politicians as "old and conservative." Id.
238 See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
239 See supra Part V.A.2.
240 See supra note 67.
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are changing; women are deviating from ryisai kenbo by postponing or
foregoing marriage and motherhood. The government, however, cannot
remain idle, waiting for this social change to occur. CEDAW demands
further effort: Japan must take positive action to prompt the social change,
guiding its citizens in building a gender equal society.

